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Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen:
Examining the Major Obstacles to
Achieving Peace in Syria’s Civil War
Amanda Pitrof*

I. INTRODUCTION
As United States Senator George Mitchell noted in a discussion of peace
negotiations in Northern Ireland, “Each human being is unique, as is each
society. It follows logically, then, that no two conflicts are the same. Much
as we would like it, there is no magic formula that, once discovered, can be
used to end all conflicts.”1
Peace negotiations on an international scale often present a number of
particularly difficult hurdles because the conflicts involved typically include
ethnic, racial, or religious differences.2 At the same time, these are highstakes conflicts because failure to find a solution risks not only the loss of
life, but third party military intervention, as well as political, economic, and
social disruption.3 On a personal level, these conflicts tear apart towns,
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2015, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. George J. Mitchell, Toward Peace in Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1136,
1139 (1999).
2. Leo F. Smyth, International Mediation and Capitulation to the Routine, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 235, 235 (2003).
3. Max Fisher, Everything is a Negotiation: How to Understand the Obama-Putin-Assad
Standoff,
WASH.
POST,
Sept.
13,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/09/13/everything-is-a-negotiation-howto-understand-the-obama-putin-assad-standoff/.
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villages, and families. Even those lucky enough to survive often find
themselves displaced, stuck living in overpopulated refugee camps far from
home.
And there is no playbook; no clear roadmap from violence to peace.
Every conflict is colored by the ethnic, religious, political, and military
interests of not just that particular country, but of the region and the rest of
the world.4
The struggle for peace has been waged over and over, from Yugoslavia,5
to Iraq,6 to Northern Ireland,7 and elsewhere.8 Syria is no exception. It is a
country with a history of violent conflict and political instability.9 The
current regime is authoritarian to the extreme, and the range of competing
religious interests is diverse.10 The civil war now consuming the country has
claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced millions, and thrown the
country’s future into question.11 This article will first briefly examine the
country’s turbulent history and the development of the current conflict.12

4. Steve Gutterman, Russia Says Iran Must be Invited to Syria Conference, REUTERS, Nov. 5,
2013,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/us-syria-crisis-russiaidUSBRE9A40BP20131105.
5. Keith Webb et al., The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency
Model: A Critical Perspective, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 171, 171-91 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
6. Andrew K. Lavin, Achieving Peace in Iraq Through Negotiations: Lessons Learned from
the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 571, 573 (2009).
7. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1138-40.
8. Darrel Menthe, Legalization and the Mediation of International Disputes: The Balkan
Experience, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83, 83-84 (2007).
9. CIA, Syria, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/sy.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Erika Solomon, Syria’s Death Toll Now Exceeds 140,000: Activist Group, REUTERS (Feb.
15,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-syria-crisis-tollidUSBREA1E0HS20140215.
12. See infra, Part II.
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Next, it will evaluate previous attempts to solve the conflict.13 Then, it will
analyze the challenges in brokering peace.14 Ultimately, this article will try
to offer potential avenues for resolution.15
Logically speaking, the use of mediation and negotiation as a means of
avoiding or ending armed conflict is always preferred. Ending an armed
conflict avoids further loss of life as well as the progressive devastation to a
country’s (or countries’) infrastructure and economy.
Building an
understanding not just of the conflict itself, but also of the inherent obstacles
to finding a solution, therefore, offers clear value. An analysis must
highlight any common characteristics across such conflicts as well as the
impact of transformative complications—in Syria, this would include the use
of chemical weapons, which introduce a strong humanitarian interest to
negotiations. As such, Syria offers a new case analysis to the ongoing study
of conflict prevention and resolution.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN SYRIA
The history of Syria is a complex one, indelibly tied to the problems it
currently faces in its peace negotiations. This section will attempt to lay out
the relevant highlights of that history as simply as possible, recognizing that
to do a thorough job could fill a library.
So often in unstable countries, strife arises between groups with ethnic,
religious, or ideological differences who are forced to live within artificially,

13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Since the initial drafting of this article in February 2014, Syria has seen a rapid escalation
of its once-internal political unrest. Third parties are no longer merely a looming threat, and the
dynamics of the conflict have radically shifted with the emergence of the Islamic State. The bulk of
this article will remain an examination of Syria’s conflict as it stood in early February 2014. See
infra, Addendum, however, for a brief reflection on the conflict since that time and the effects of
those changes on the issues addressed in this article.
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and even arbitrarily, drawn borders. Many of these countries have
boundaries drawn by colonial powers bartering between themselves for
political and economic gain. Once these nations vacated, the newly born
countries found themselves in a power vacuum, populated by groups with
nothing in common but this new citizenship. Syria fits squarely within this
category. Its borders were drawn by the Allied powers as part of the San
Remo Conference following the end of World War I.16 The country
remained under the control of France and Great Britain until it was granted
independence in 1946.17
When the last French troops departed, “Syria” was a county whose
borders were drawn around various Muslim, Christian, and even Jewish
communities.18 Within the Muslim population alone, there are several active
factions, including Sunnis (which includes approximately 75% of the
population),19 Alawites (a small minority including current President Bashar
al-Assad and the majority of the current regime),20 and Druze (an
unorthodox branch of Shia Islam).21 Where those three major sects were
originally separated into autonomous regions by the French,22 independence
brought territorial unification.23
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first decades of Syrian independence were
marked by violence and a series of military coups as various groups vied for

16. San Remo Conference, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/israel/sanremo-resolution/p15248.
17. CIA, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Max
Fisher,
The
‘Alawite
Lane,’
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
15,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/15/the-alawite-lane/.
21. CIA, supra note 9.
22. Syria Profile: A Chronology of Key Events, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-14703995 (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Syria Profile].
23. Syria, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
578856/Syria/29922/World-War-II-and-independence (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
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control.24 In the first decade following the departure of the last French
troops, the country had twenty different cabinets and drafted four divergent
constitutions.25 In 1949 alone, the military led three coups.26 It was not until
Hafiz al-Assad took power in a bloodless coup in 1970 that the country
found some stability. As a member of the Alawi sect of Islam, Assad
initially distanced the government from religion, amending the constitution
to remove the requirement that the country’s president be a Muslim.27 The
secular shift was short-lived. Stability was maintained through brutality,28
and after the Sunni Muslim community and the Muslim Brotherhood led a
series of failed riots, Hafiz al-Assad once more began to stress the
importance of Syria’s adherence to Islam.29 A series of so-called
“emergency laws” allowed the regime to lift protection for individual
freedoms at will.30 Seven additional emergency laws and amendments
followed, suspending personal liberties and further strengthening the
president’s position.31 These laws, which remained in effect until the
uprising of 2011, authorized arbitrary arrests and detention and suspended
the protection of due process.32 Under these rules, the regime’s security
officers could issue arrest orders without the authority of a court and without
oversight from the government.33 Mass arrests and security sweeps fell
within the scope of these rules.34 Another measure passed in 1979 following

24. CIA, supra note 9.
25. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Farid N. Ghadry, Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath, MIDDLE E. Q., Winter 2005, at 6170, available at http://www.meforum.org/683/syrian-reform-what-lies-beneath.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood on a number of military cadets made
membership in the organization a crime punishable by death.35
When Sunni Muslim activists launched a massive protest in the city of
Hama in 1982, Assad’s brutality reached its zenith.36 For days, troops hit the
city with artillery fire, razing the city and killing an estimated 20,000
people.37 The massacre is now considered the single biggest attack by an
Arab ruler on his own people in the modern era.38 An entire city was
demolished, but the rebellion was effectively neutralized—an outcome the
Assad regime would seek again later.
In June of 2000, Hafez al-Assad died, and was succeeded by his second
son, Bashar.39 On his ascension, the new president promised to build “a
better society” for his people, and soon after ordered the release of 600
political prisoners.40 Optimism abounded for a more democratic Syria.
Diplomatic relations were restored with Iraq and Lebanon for the first time
in decades, and the European Union re-launched a dialogue with Damascus
as relations with the West gradually improved.41 As was the case during
Hafez’s reign, however, the policy did not last.
Tensions with the West began to escalate in 2007 after the United
Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency

35. Id. A number of those killed were Alawites, the minority religious sect to which the Assad
family and the bulk of its regime belong. Id.
36. 1982: Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1,
2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syriamassacre-1982-archive [hereinafter Hama Rebellion].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Ghadry, supra note 30. It is worth noting that Bashar was never expected to assume
power.
Bashar
al-Assad,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/711020/Bashar-al-Assad (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
The second son, Bashar, was trained as an ophthalmologist in London. Id. It was only after his
elder brother, Bassel, was killed in a car crash in 1994 that Bashar became Syria’s next-in-line. Id.
40. Ghadry, supra note 30.
41. Syria Profile, supra note 22.

162

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss1/4

6

Pitrof: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to A

[Vol. 15: 157, 2015]

Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

(IAEA), uncovered traces of man-made uranium at two separate sites in
Syria.42 The United States accused Assad’s regime of attempting to produce
weapons of mass destruction and levied new sanctions against Damascus.43
To hasten matters, corruption was—and is—widespread in Syria.
Experts estimated that as much as 85% of Syrian oil profits were diverted to
the Assad family and its collaborators.44 At $55 per barrel,45 the 600,000
barrels per day produced by Syria’s oil fields generated $12 billion, and yet
in 2003, Syria’s total budget was only $8.4 billion, including non-oil trade
and taxation.46
Spurred by spirited uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and protests in Libya,
a Syrian revolt began in March of 2011.47 Activists called for a “Day of
Rage,” demanding the repeal of the emergency laws, release of political
prisoners, and removal of corrupt officials originally appointed by the Assad
regime.48 Several protestors were arrested for displaying graffiti calling for
the downfall of Assad’s regime.49 Despite widespread arrests by security
forces, demonstrations continued. Within months, the crackdown ratcheted
upward as electricity, water, and cell service were cut off.50 Assad ordered
thousands of troops, along with tanks and snipers, to quell the protests, firing
on civilians as often as active combatants.51 Assad accused the protestors of
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Ghadry, supra note 30.
45. This is an extremely conservative estimate. See Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels
Outlook,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Oct.
7,
2014);
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/prices.cfm.
46. Ghadry, supra note 30.
47. CIA, supra note 9.
48. Associated Press, Syrian Uprising Timelines of Key Events, POLITICO, Sept. 9, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/syria-timeline-96270.html [hereinafter Uprising Timelines];
Syria Profile, supra note 22.
49. Uprising Timelines, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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being Israeli agents, but also announced several conciliatory measures in an
effort to end the rebellion.52 Dozens of political prisoners were released,
government officials were dismissed, and the emergency laws were
repealed.53 But the protests continued unabated.54 In July, opposition forces
met in Istanbul, Turkey to form a unified opposition.55
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S REACTION AND EARLY
ATTEMPTS FOR RESOLUTION
The West was quick to decry the government’s crackdown on
protestors. As the strife continued, several members of the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council attempted to pass a resolution denouncing the Assad
regime and calling for Assad himself to step down.56 Russia and China
vetoed the effort, first in October 2011 and again in February 2012.57 In
November 2011, one month after the first resolution failed, the Arab League
voted to suspend Syria’s membership to the group, imposing sanctions and
accusing Assad’s government of “failing to implement an Arab peace
plan.”58
There was renewed hope for resolution in late 2011 when Syria agreed
to an Arab League initiative, allowing a monitoring mission into the

52. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
53. The repeal, of course, did nothing to curb the mass arrests conducted by the security
forces. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Since that time, however, the opposition movement has struggled for cohesion, and
any attempt to bring all opposition members to the negotiation table consistently fail. See infra for
discussion of the opposition’s shortcomings as a cohesive group.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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country.59 Within two months, however, the mission was suspended, and
both sides traded accusations of duplicity and bias.60
By August of 2012, the U.N. General Assembly passed its own
resolution over the protests of Russia, China, and several other members
demanding that Assad resign.61 Frustrated by the lack of progress, Kofi
Annan resigned as special peace envoy of both the U.N. and the Arab
League.62 Mr. Annan blamed the intractability of the Syrian government,
the militarization of the Syrian rebels,63 and the failure of the U.N. Security
Council to rally behind his efforts.64
The U.N. brokered another cease-fire in October of 2012, but the peace
was brief, and the mission was soon suspended.65 Tensions would quickly
accelerate in August of 2013 when allegations arose that the Assad regime
utilized chemical weapons in a strike on the outskirts of Damascus.66 A
U.N. investigation uncovered the deaths of over 300 civilians, and Western
59. Id.
60. The Arab League monitors accused the Assad regime of “escalating the security situation,”
while Syria insisted that the monitor mission was only intended to pressure the U.N. Security
Council into approving foreign intervention. CNN Wire Staff, Amid Violence, Arab League
Suspends
Observer
Mission
in
Syria,
CNN
(Jan.
28,
2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/28/world/meast/syria-unrest/.
61. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
62. Rick Gladstone, Resigning as Envoy to Syria, Annan Casts Wide Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
2,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syria-peaceenvoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
63. See infra Part III (discussing the arming of Syrian rebels by third parties).
64. Gladstone, supra note 62 (“[W]ithout serious, purposeful and united international pressure,
including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian
government in the first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a political
process. . . . It is clear that President Bashar al-Assad must leave office[.]”).
65. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
66. A recent U.S. human rights report identified the attack “as one of ‘many horrors in a civil
war filled with countless crimes against humanity, from the torture and murder of prisoners to the
targeting of civilians with barrel bombs and Scud missiles.’” Syrian Civil War “Horrors” Lead U.S.
Human Rights Report, BBC (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-26377552
[hereinafter Civil War Horrors].
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powers, the United States in particular, threatened retaliatory missile
strikes.67 The violation of humanitarian law sparked public outrage in
addition to political fallout. For several days, the conflict looked poised to
expand from what was essentially a civil war68 (and a political conflict) to a
regional, or even global, military conflict with the introduction of third party
military forces.69 It was narrowly avoided with the introduction of U.N.
Security Council resolution 2118, demanding the destruction or removal of
Syria’s chemical stockpile by mid-2014.70
As of February 2014, an estimated 140,000 people had been killed in the
civil war, including 7,000 children.71 Another 3.5 million people were
displaced within Syria’s borders, and 2.5 million others abandoned Syria for
neighboring countries.72 The number of refugees was expected to double by
the end of the year.73

67. What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, BBC (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442 [hereinafter Geneva II Conference].
68. It cannot be overlooked that as it stood in early 2014, the Syrian civil war is not limited to
Syrian combatants. International volunteers and extremists seeking to participate in what they
viewed as a “holy war” were present, but at the time of this writing, their numbers were incredibly
limited in comparison to the number of troops that would likely be introduced by a third party.
69. Geneva II Conference, supra note 67.
70. S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013), available at
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf.
71. Solomon, supra note 11.
72. The report estimates that nearly 900,000 refugees reside in Lebanon, 600,000 in Turkey,
590,000 in Jordan, 215,000 in northern Iraq, 135,000 in Egypt, 20,000 in North Africa, and 30,000
elsewhere. Syrians Internally Displaced by War Expected to Nearly Double to 6.5 Million by Year’s
End,
UN
NEWS
CENTRE
(Feb.
5,
2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47084#.VFF8qPnF98F
[hereinafter
Syrians
Internally Displaced].
73. Id.
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A. Attempts at International Action
Lack of consensus within the international community has hampered
efforts to ease the crisis. An international coalition (later known as the
Action Group for Syria), consisting of the U.N., Arab League, and EU
(China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S., and Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and
Qatar) met in June 2012 to discuss the conflict, ultimately writing what has
become known as the Geneva Communiqué.74 The pact called for the
creation of a transitional Syrian government and a clear plan for elections,
noting that any political solution to the conflict would need to meet several
conditions.75 However, even as the plan was announced, delegations from
the U.S. and Russia publicly disagreed on Assad’s role in the transitional
government.76
A similar plan was outlined a year later at the G8 meeting in Northern
Ireland. In the wake of the Assad regime’s chemical weapon attacks in the
summer of 2013, the group outlined a seven-step plan for peace,
condemning the use of chemical weaponry, supporting the creation of a nonsectarian government,77 and calling once more for a transitional

74. The gathering later became known as the Geneva I conference. Action Group for Syria,
Final
Communiqué,
U.N.
(June
30,
2012),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf [hereinafter
Geneva Communiqué].
75. Id. at 3-4. The communiqué declared that “[a]ny political settlement must deliver a
transition that: [o]ffers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria; [e]stablishes
clear steps according to a firm time-table towards the realization of that perspective; [c]an be
implemented in a climate of safety for all, stability and calm; [and i]s reached rapidly without further
bloodshed and violence and is credible.” Id. at 2.2.
76. UN Envoy Calls for Transitional Government in Syria, BBC (June 30, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18650775.
77. G8 Leaders Agree to 7-point Plan on Syria as Summit Wraps, CBC NEWS (June 18, 2013),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/g8-leaders-agree-to-7-point-plan-on-syria-as-summit-wraps1.1329796 [hereinafter G8 Plan].
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government.78 Perhaps most importantly, the group vowed to “maximize the
diplomatic pressure” to bring all involved parties to the table.79
A second conference—the Geneva II Conference—was organized to
engage the Assad regime with the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.80 While considered mildly successful
in bringing both sides together, that achievement was mitigated by several
factors. Though present, the Syrian government announced that its official
delegation had no plans “to hand over power to anyone,”81 characterizing the
ongoing conflict as a “war against terrorism.”82 As for the opposition
coalition, only “intense pressure” from its allies persuaded most of the
group’s leaders to make an appearance.83 One-third of the active members
flatly refused to attend a vote on whether to participate, and the Syrian
National Council—the largest block within the coalition—reportedly
announced plans to abandon the coalition, refusing to attend any peace
negotiations until Assad agreed to leave power.84 As of the drafting of this
article, no agreement had been reached at the Geneva II Convention.
As it stands, the Syrian civil war has cost hundreds of thousands of lives
on both sides, caused widespread conflict, and resulted in the destruction of
many of the country’s major cities. When this struggle is finally resolved,
rebuilding will take billions of dollars in aid. As it is, Syria’s neighbors are
already feeling the strain as tens of thousands of refugees stream across their
borders. Both sides of the conflict are entrenched, refusing to even approach
the negotiation table without a sign of capitulation from the other. To make
matters worse, both sides have been equipped with weaponry from third
78. Once again, a transitional government was demanded without a consensus regarding
Bashar al-Assad’s role in that transition. Id.
79. G8 Plan, supra note 77.
80. Geneva II Conference, supra note 67.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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party nations guarding their interests. The hurdles facing resolution abound,
but the next section of this article will attempt to identify the major obstacles
and offer possible remedies.
IV. THE BIGGEST HURDLES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Problem #1: Are negotiations even likely to bring peace? At this point,
the possibility of brokering peace through one-to-one negotiations between
the Assad regime and opposition forces appears to be a long shot. Both
sides have dug in, refusing to even appear at the negotiation table without
concessions the other is unwilling (nor are they realistically likely) to grant.
As large portions of Syria’s opposition coalition refuse to even appear for
negotiations until Assad relinquishes power, the government continues to
regard the opposition movement as a product of internal and external
terrorism.85 Left to their own devices, there is little hope for reconciliation.
It seems more likely the two will escalate violence in an effort to gain an
advantage.86
Proposed Solution: The use of mediation, with the involvement of a
neutral third party to direct discussions and act as an unbiased go-between, is
the better option. Geneva II demonstrated the success of forcing the two
sides to the table through diplomatic pressure, suggesting that bringing in a
third party would at least have some usefulness in raising hopes for a
temporary cease-fire and engagement in discussions from both sides. Of
course, mediation brings its own set of problems.87 To start with, there does
not seem to be a consensus as to who should be at the table to represent each
side.
85. Id.
86. This was already seen when the Assad regime resorted to the use of chemical warfare on
innocent civilians.
87. See infra Problem #5 (discussing the difficulties in choosing such an arbitrator, as well as
combatting international interests and dealing with international scrutiny).
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Problem #2: Who should be at the table? The first step in attempting
peace negotiations must be determining who should represent the opposing
factions. The nature of Syria’s opposition movement makes this particularly
difficult. As discussed earlier, this conflict encompasses a full range of
diverse groups, from secular to extremist.88 Numerous groups consider
themselves a part of the opposition movement, but finding a means of
unifying has been difficult. The Syrian National Coalition,89 an umbrella
group formed in Istanbul, considers itself the leadership of the opposition
and is recognized by the Arab League and several countries (including the
United States)90 as the true “representative” of the Syrian people.91 Yet
some Syrians disagree, arguing that the Group cannot be truly representative
of what began as a popular uprising since it is dominated by exiles and
Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers.92 Some even accuse the group of being
manipulated by the Arab League.93 Dozens of other groups (both diplomatic
and armed opposition groups) consider themselves a part of the opposition
movement, ranging from the more moderate94 to the extremists motivated by
sectarian interests.95 Each has a diverging opinion not only on the future of
Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but on what should follow.96 None of these fringe
organizations currently have a seat at the negotiations table, and without
representation for their interests, they continue to fight with total disregard
88. See supra Part II.
89. Initially called the Syrian National Council, the Coalition was a new iteration created in
2012. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
90. Britain, France, Turkey, and the Gulf states also recognize Syria’s opposition National
Coalition as “the legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
91. Id.; see S.B., Who Are the Syrian Opposition?, THE ECONOMIST (June 19, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-12.
92. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
93. Id.
94. This includes Liwa al-Taheed, which is at least believed to be part of the Supreme Military
Command, headed by a defected brigadier-general with the Coalition. Id.
95. This includes Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda. Id.
96. Id.
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for the proceedings in Geneva.97 Such “behind the table” conflicts serve as a
major barrier to progress at peace negotiations.98 Moreover, a peace
agreement satisfying the Assad regime and only select groups within the
opposition is unlikely to end these “behind the table” disagreements within
the opposition community and, therefore, offers little hope for resolution.99
Proposed Solution: These are issues to be worked out within the
opposition movement. Any hopeful mediation must begin with a unified
opposition devoted to negotiating a settlement. Unrepresented groups will
otherwise have no incentive to lay down arms. Even if the Syrian National
Coalition was considered an adequate representative for the movement, the
organization has made any peace negotiation conditional on the resignation
of President Bashar al-Assad. Unsurprisingly, it is a point on which the
Assad regime refuses to agree.
Problem #3: The fractured nature of the opposition movement. To
determine who should represent the opposition, the movement must first find
a rallying point. As discussed earlier, the movement currently offers almost
an entire political and ideological spectrum under the single umbrella of
“opposition.” When the opposition coalition is intact, it incorporates at least
seven major movements: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus
Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee, the
Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Bloc, and Independents.100 One of the problems
is that the nature of the revolt has drastically shifted since it began back in

97. Id.
98. Robert H. Mnookin et al., Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation Table: Internal Conflicts
Among Israelis and Among Palestinians, 6 NEV. L.J. 299, 300-01 (2005) (noting that broader
demands to satisfy the more extreme members of a side essentially dooms negotiations across the
table, while more palatable offers “risk[] turmoil and even violence ‘behind the table’ within each
community”).
99. Id. at 301.
100. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 4:
SYRIA’S
POLITICAL
OPPOSITION
6
(2012),
available
at
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Political_Opposition.pdf.
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March 2011.101 Early protestors fought for political freedoms and the repeal
of repressive laws.102 As the conflict dragged on, more radical factions
jumped in.103 While many of these groups shared the early protestors’ goal
of overturning the government, their ultimate objectives proved
polarizing.104 Some left the country and joined up with exiles, creating new
political groups.105 A number of smaller groups joined to become the Free
Syrian Army,106 attacking government checkpoints and facilities in
retaliation for government strikes.107 The dozens of groups involved are
fragmented geographically, ideologically, and even by the influence of
foreign backers.108
Proposed Solution: The ultimate goal must be defined before the
opposition can select who will represent this goal at the negotiation table.
The various factions could first agree to cease hostilities, then move to the
more complex questions of a transitional government (and Assad’s role in
it). Ultimately, any kind of solution will require an effort to include as many
Syrian interests as possible.109 Without such considerations, opposition

101. See Liz Sly, Islamic Law Comes to Rebel-held Areas of Syria, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-law-comes-to-rebel-heldsyria/2013/03/19/b310532e-90af-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html.
102. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
103. Id.
104. O’BAGY, supra note 100.
105. S.B., supra note 91.
106. This is merely a label, not a real organization. See id. There is no strict hierarchy or
leadership; the title is a label to loosely group smaller factions together. See id. It does, however,
“attract funding from expatriates, Gulf governments and private individuals who wanted to see Mr.
Assad go.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See infra Problem #4 (discussing this influence of third parties on the peace
negotiation process).
109. Vanessa J. Jimenez, Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road Ahead, 13
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21, 22-23 (2005) (noting that the “ability of Iraqi leaders to forge a peaceful future
will depend on the manner in which the government ensures that the unique identities, values, and
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leadership risks the loss of popular support, creating a new government with
the same flaws of its predecessor. The challenge is parsing those interests
out from the influence of third parties.
Problem #4: Influence of international interests. This seems to be the
biggest hurdle to any attempt at brokering peace, whether through mediation
or negotiation. In protracted conflicts, problems become more widespread.
Everyone eventually has a stake. Turkey and Israel have been drawn into
direct conflict with Syrian troops on several occasions,110 while Lebanon,
Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other countries in North Africa have seen the arrival
of tens of thousands of refugees seeking to escape the conflict.111 In 2014,
the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) requested $6.5 billion in aid to support
both refugees and internally displaced persons.112
While it is understandable that almost everyone may have an interest in
the outcome of a conflict, these interests create problems when trying to
establish common ground. Where the original protestors in Syria might
have sought a more democratic political system, extremist fighters seek to
install an Islamic state. Beyond those actively fighting, the Arab League
wishes to end the ongoing threat of regional instability; and on an even
broader scope, Russian leaders in the Kremlin wish to preserve the Assad
regime in order to retain hold on their last remaining naval base outside of
the former Soviet bloc, while U.S. officials would welcome the opportunity
to weaken Russia’s influence in the region. All manifest themselves in
different ways: activists in Syria continue to fight, the Arab League offers
monitoring missions, and the Russian and U.S. governments overtly or
covertly continue arms sales to their respective interests.113
concerns of its diverse ethnic, religious, and national minorities are respected and given a voice in
the governance of the country”).
110. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
111. Syrians Internally Displaced, supra note 72.
112. Id.
113. This is not to suggest that Russia is alone in supplying arms to the Syrian conflict, merely
that the Kremlin is a prominent example. Thomas Grove & Erika Solomon, Russia Boosts Arms
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Arming rebels is not a new tactic, but it is a risky one.114 If it fails to
turn the tide of a conflict in one’s favor, it can actually prolong it. Even
more risky, as recent history has shown, arming rebel groups runs the risk of
arms falling into the hands of extremist groups, empowering the groups the
West seeks most to avoid.115 Fueling one side with arms only escalates a
conflict, pushing allies of an opponent to respond in kind. Syria is a perfect
model. Russia has repeatedly made efforts to ship arms to the Assad
government; while the United States refuses to directly arm Syrian rebels,
there is clear evidence that it and several western allies, including France,
have done exactly that for opposition groups.116 Such influence has
produced no clear results other than a rise in the death tolls and the arming
of extremist groups.117
The influx of competing international interests is likewise an issue with
a tendency to prolong conflict, bogging down negotiations as each party vies
for its best outcome. While countries in the West seek resolutions on
sanctions and military strikes through the U.N. in the hope of achieving
humanitarian aims,118 Russia and China consistently use their veto power to
Sales to Syria Despite World Pressure, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/us-syria-russia-arms-idUSTRE81K13420120221;
see
also Liz Sly & Karen DeYoung, In Syria, New Influx of Weapons to Rebels Tilts the Battle Against
Assad, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-syria-new-influx-ofweapons-to-rebels-tilts-the-battle-against-assad/2013/02/23/a6bf2bc0-7dfb-11e2-9073e9dda4ac6a66_story.html.
114. Mark Hosenball, Congress Secretly Approves U.S. Weapons Flow to ‘Moderate’ Syrian
Rebels, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-usasyria-rebels-idUSBREA0Q1S320140127; see also James Risen et al., U.S.-approved Arms for Libya
Rebels
Fell
Into
Jihadis’
Hands,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
5,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libyan-rebels-with-us-approvalfell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
115. Risen et al., supra note 114.
116. Grove & Solomon, supra note 113; Hosenball, supra note 114.
117. Sly, supra note 101.
118. See Civil War Horrors, supra note 66. There are of course other interests involved here,
such as regional stability and oil. United States President Barack Obama was not shy about his
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prevent U.N. intervention.119 The nexus of the conflict for these parties
becomes the U.N., drawing focus and energy from the actual conflict.
The manner in which these mediations are conducted seems to
exacerbate the problem—to borrow a well-known idiom, “too many cooks in
the kitchen spoils the broth.” As discussed earlier, the use of mediation over
negotiation seems the more promising choice.120 That being said, allowing
twenty-six countries, in addition to the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, the
High Representative of the European Union, and the Secretary General of
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to take part in the Geneva II
Convention121 draws attention away from problem solving.122 For example,
a dispute over Iran’s potential participation became the focal point of the
conference for a solid week and a half, as the international community
debated the merits of inviting the controversial state.123 In that span of time,
an untold number of people were killed, others wounded, and even more
displaced.124 Adding twenty-six more parties to the table means adding
twenty-six more viewpoints to the discussions, each with individual interests
and objectives.

intent to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons against civilians. Jeff Mason and
Matt Spetalnick, Obama Makes Case for Punishing Syria Over Gas Attack, REUTERS, Aug. 28,
2013,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-syria-crisisidUSBRE97K0EL20130828.
119. Syria Profile, supra note 22.
120. See supra Part II.
121. This list does not even include the participants representing the Syrian government and the
country’s opposition movement.
122. See Bama Atassi, Explaining the Geneva II Peace Talks on Syria, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 19,
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/explaining-geneva-ii-peace-talks-syria2014118142853937726.html.
123. Iran Invited to Geneva 2, Syrian Opposition Threatens to Withdraw, RIA-NOVOSTI (Jan.
19, 2014), http://rt.com/news/iran-invited-geneva-conference-867/.
124. Syrians Internally Displaced, supra note 72.
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Proposed Solution: The simpler the conflict, the simpler the resolution.
Removing as many conflicting interests as possible is a pathway to success.
Syria’s civil war is indelibly tied to differing political, religious, and cultural
interests, and when the dust ultimately settles, it is the Syrian people who
must be confident in the method through which they reconcile these
differences. It is they who must pick up the pieces and try to move forward,
and so it seems logical that the diverse interests of the Syrian people must
take precedence in any mediation efforts. The international community has
taken advantage of several opportunities they have had to lay out their own
interests in the creation of proposals, like the Geneva Communiqué or the
G8’s seven-step plan for peace. There is no question that any resolution
must be in accordance with accepted international law. While these
proposals and declarations should unquestionably be submitted to the
conflicting sides for consideration in working toward a resolution,
attempting to reconcile the interests of twenty-six different countries adds
unnecessary complications to the process. This conflict is dense enough
without the added burdens of so many other parties.125
Problem #5: Public scrutiny elevating the stakes. In the same vein, the
nature of such publicized conferences, like Geneva I and Geneva II,
encourage public scrutiny, raising expectations on an international scale. In
such a protracted conflict, where the lines in the sand have been so clearly
drawn, negotiations reach a point where anything less than a complete
victory has the appearance of a loss. Participating countries enter with set
goals and with the understanding that developments within the summit will
largely become public knowledge.
As evidenced by the disputed
participation of Iran at the Geneva II Convention, this individual interest
suggests that the priority at such summits is not achieving a common goal of
peace but in pursuing individual interests and saving face on an international
125. Ideally, of course, this removal of conflicting interests would involve a cessation of arms
shipments to either side, in the interest of ending the violent conflict as soon as possible.
Realistically, this is unlikely to occur, especially given the difficulty in exposing exactly who is
supplying what to whom.
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stage. Given the fractured nature of the Syrian opposition, risking the
appearance of anything less than a complete victory is a risky proposition.
A partial victory, as discussed above, runs a chance of alienating minority
groups and prolonging conflict.
Proposed Solution: There has been some suggestion that peace in
deeply entrenched conflicts is more often found through “quiet diplomacy”
than on the international stage.126 Negotiations handled without such
concern for public image allow for more practical, and likely more
productive, dialogue because special representatives and personal envoys
acting in this capacity “tend not to reveal what they do and how they do
it.”127 This is a process that saw great success in solving conflicts in
Northern Ireland, Haiti, Guatemala, the Balkans, and elsewhere.128 When
parties are not required to answer for every step of negotiation, posturing
seems to take a backseat to practical problem solving. Moreover, not only
would such a method reduce public scrutiny, but it would likewise diminish
the number of voices present at the mediation table.
Problem #5: Who may act as mediator? Even after mediation efforts
are pared down to involve the most affected parties, conflicting international
interests complicate the process of selecting an unbiased third party to serve
as mediator.129 For there to be any hope of success, a mediator must have
the trust of both parties, along with an ability to operate without bias.130
126. Michael R. Fowler, The Increasingly Complicated World of International Mediation, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 977, 978 (2003).
127. Id.
128. Lavin, supra note 6, at 574-75.
129. This assumes, of course, that a third party mediator is appropriate. Russia and Iran have
both pushed the idea that the ongoing conflict is entirely Syrian, and therefore, the Syrian people
should be left to negotiate their own peace. Ilya Arkhipov et al., Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against
Military Aid to Syria Protests After Libya, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syriaprotests-after-libya.html.
130. The Right Mediator: How Do You Know?, INT’L MEDIATION INST.,
http://imimediation.org/the-right-mediator-how-do-you-know (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
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Given the number of conflicting interests in this conflict, finding such a
person or group is no easy feat. Religion, political ideology, humanitarian
causes, and questions of regional stability are all tied to this conflict.
Proposed Solution: The most viable choice is Lakhdar Brahimi, current
representative of both the U.N. and the Arab League.131
In negotiating peace for Northern Ireland, it was U.S. Senator George
Mitchell’s patience and his belief that there is “no such thing as a conflict
that can’t be ended . . . [that] [n]o matter how ancient the conflict, no matter
how hateful, no matter how hurtful, peace can prevail,”132 that ultimately
brought an end to the country’s strife. By the time he served as a mediator
in Ireland, Mitchell had developed a familiarity and, more importantly, a
respect for the culture with which he was involved.133 His work as the
Majority Leader in the United States Senate moreover lent him experience in
the process of understanding “trade-offs, communication, and effective
listening.”134
Like Mitchell, Brahimi is an experienced mediator. An Algerian
diplomat, Brahimi was involved in the resolution of conflicts ranging from
Lebanon’s 15-year civil war to the establishment of Iraq’s first free elections
in 2004.135 Now serving in place of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan as envoy to Syria, Brahimi is renowned for his patience and
creativity.136 Of equal importance, Brahimi has a familiarity with Islamic
culture. Himself a member of the Sunni branch of Islam, Brahimi will find
131. Ian Black, Geneva II Talks on Syria: Key Participants, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/geneva-ii-talks-syria-key-participants.
132. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, TRUMAN INST. PEACE PRIZE ADDRESS: PRINCIPLES OF PEACE:
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST 4 (June 8, 1999).
133. John D. Feerick, The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
229, 236-37 (2003) (discussing the importance of symbols, such as what locations would be the
venues for the talks that would take place and his decisions on how many people should be at each
discussion).
134. Mitchell, supra note 132, at ix, 5.
135. Black, supra note 131.
136. Id.

178

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss1/4

22

Pitrof: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to A

[Vol. 15: 157, 2015]

Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

comfort with the “honor, dignity, and self-respect” valued in Muslim
culture.137 His familiarity with and respect for the norms of Muslim culture
would be a significant advantage in bringing both sides together.
V. CONCLUSION
It would be naïve to assert that these five roadblocks are the only
impediments to reaching peace in Syria. New issues seem to arise every
day, ranging from economic and political to social questions. It is not the
contention of this article that solving these few issues would lead to
resolution or even accelerate progress toward a resolution. It is the
contention of this article, however, that these five concerns must be
addressed before there can be any hope for progress. The Syrian people
must be allowed to determine their future, and international participation in
that process must be limited to a point that it facilitates that determination,
rather than bogging it down.
Solutions to armed conflict are never easy. And as the protracted
negotiations in Syria have shown, nor are they quick. Only by focusing on
Syrian interests, with an eye to minority protection as well as to majority,
can peace eventually be found in Syria. Both sides must first agree on a
shared goal of peace and find a framework for agreement in the hope of
ultimately reaching that goal.
ADDENDUM: A BRIEF REVIEW OF WHAT HAS CHANGED FROM
FEBRUARY TO SEPTEMBER
Nearly 2,000 people died in Syria in the first nine days of the Geneva II
Conference,138 and once more, participants in Geneva failed to produce any

137. See Joshua Berry, The Trouble We Have with the Iraqis is Us: A Proposal for Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the New Iraq, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 487, 511 (2005).
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tangible results. Fighting continued in Syria throughout the spring of 2014,
as both sides struggled to gain any momentum. Amid the continuing
conflict, President Assad was somewhat inexplicably reelected in June for a
third term by a landslide majority in government-controlled areas of the
country. 139 Although the “election” marked the first time in decades that
other candidates were permitted to run against a member of the Assad
family, the exercise was viewed as little more than a farce by the West.140
In August, U.N. officials declared the Syrian crisis “the biggest
humanitarian emergency of our era,” noting that “[a]lmost half of all Syrians
have now been forced to abandon their homes and flee for their lives.”141
Over three million Syrians have fled across the country’s borders, and
experts estimate another six and a half million people have been displaced
within Syria’s borders.142 At the end of August, the Human Rights Data
Analysis Group placed the death toll since March 2011 at 191,369.143

138. Reuters, At Least 1,870 Die During Geneva Talks, DAILY STAR, Jan. 31, 2014,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/articleprint.aspx?id=246045&mode=print.
139. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Wins Third Term, BBC (June 5, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27706471. Regions in the north and east, held by
rebels, were excluded entirely from voting. Id. Officials claimed that 11.63 million Syrians
participated out of a total 15.85 million Syrians eligible to vote. Id. President Assad was credited
with receiving 88.7% of the total votes, while his challengers, Hassan al-Nouri and Maher Hajjar,
received 4.3% and 3.2%, respectively. Id.
140. Id. United States Secretary of State John Kerry noted, “You can’t have an election where
millions of your people don’t even have an ability to vote.” Id.
141. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Syrian Refugees Surpass 3 Million, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/middleeast/syrian-refugees-surpass-3-millionun-says.html?_r=0.
142. Id. Syria’s neighbors have been struggling under the weight of the onslaught. Id.
Lebanon, which itself has a population under 5 million people, has taken in more than 1.1 million
Syrian refugees, while Jordan has an estimated 608,000 and Turkey another 815,000, according to
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Id.
143. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Death Toll in Syria Estimated at 191,000, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-estimate-of-dead-in-syrianconflict-to-191000.html.
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By far, however, the most significant shift in the ongoing conflict has
been the emergence of the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS, the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).
A splinter cell of al-Qaeda, it is the IS’s goal to create an Islamic state
(governed by sharia law) that spans the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria.144
Since bursting onto the international scene in 2014, the group has been
responsible for kidnapping schoolchildren for radical indoctrination; seizing
airports, television stations, oil fields,145 and cities; and brutally beheading
western citizens.146 By July of 2014, the IS was in control of all Syrian cities
between Deir Ezzor and the Iraqi border—nearly 90 miles—as well as a
significant portion of the Sunni region of Iraq.147 In response, world leaders
have pledged their respective militaries to combat the IS’s growing
influence.148 To further complicate matters, the IS draws its radical recruits
from every corner of the globe.149 In short, since February, this onceinternal struggle rapidly escalated into what is now unquestionably a global
conflict.
Events since spring have made any attempt at mediation a distant hope.
The IS has demonstrated its disinterest in any form of negotiation. There
can be no hope of peace in Syria—or the region as a whole—until the threat

144. CNN
Library,
ISIS
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Sept.
15,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts.
145. On July 3, 2014, the IS took control of the al-Omar oil field, Syria’s largest oil field,
capable of producing 75,000 barrels of oil per day. Id.
146. Id.
147. Holly Yan & Samira Said, Floodgates Open as ISIS Bridges Victories Between Syria and
Iraq, CNN (July 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war/.
148. Editorial Board, The Attack on ISIS Expands to Syria, N.Y, TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/opinion/president-obamas-speech-on-isis-has-to-addresscosts.html.
149. There are recruits from Europe and the U.S., but experts point to Turkey as one of the
largest sources of new recruits—over 1,000 new IS members have come from Turkey alone. Ceylan
Yeginsu, ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits from Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html.
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of the IS is addressed. Simplification, therefore, remains the watchword. To
that end, the best that can be said for the radical group’s rise to prominence
is that it provides common ground (however slight) for pro-Assad and rebel
forces, as well as the international community. There is no realistic hope
that both sides will turn their collective arms on the IS, but as of the final
writing of this article, the Islamic State holds nearly half of Syria’s
territory.150 This newest obstacle must, by necessity, become the focus of
the conflict before the two sides have any chance of finding a path toward
peace.

150.

See Yan & Said, supra note 147.
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